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In this paper, we provide a conceptual framework for understanding the phenomenon of
exclusive dealing, and we explore the motivations for and effects of its use. For a broad class of
models, we characterize the outcome of a contracting game in which manufacturers may employ
exclusive dealing provisions in their contracts. We then apply this characterization to a sequence
of specialized settings. We demonstrate that exclusionary contractual provisions may be irrelevant,
anticompetitive, or efficiency-enhancing, depending upon the setting. More specifically, we exhibit
the potential for anticompetitive effects in non-coincident markets (that is, markets other than the
ones in which exclusive dealing is practiced), and we explore the potential for the enhancement of
efficiency in a setting where common representation gives rise to incentive conflicts. In each
instance, we describe the manner in which equilibrium outcomes would be altered by a ban on












A manufacturer engages in exclusive dealing when it prohibits a retailer or distributor who
carries its product from selling certain other products (often, although not always, those of its direct
competitors). For example, in one well-known antitrust case, Standard Fashion Co. v. Ma~rane-
Houston Co. (1922), a leading manufacturer of dress patterns (Standard) contracted with a leading
Boston retailer (Magrane-Houston) to sell its patterns on the condition that Magrane-Houston not sell
the patterns of any other manufacturer. 1
Assessments of exclusive dealing by various antitrust commentators are remarkably divergent.
Throughout much of this century, the Courts have treated exclusive dealing harshly. Fearful of the
foreclosure of competitors from retail outlets, the Court in the Magrane-Houston case struck down the
contract, arguing that “[t]he restriction of each merchant to one pattern manufacturer must in
hundreds, perhaps in thousands, of small communities amount to giving such single pattern
manufacturer a monopoly of the business in such community. ”
At the same time, persuaded by the arguments of the Chicago School, many have come to
believe that exclusive dealing cannot serve as a profitable mechanism for monopolization and that it
should instead be regarded as an efficient contractual form. Commenting on the Magrane-Houston
case, Bork [1978] puts the argument this way:
“Standard can extract in the prices that it charges all that its line is worth. It cannot charge
the retailer that full amount in money and then charge it again in exclusivity that tie retailer
does not wish to grant. To suppose that it can is to commit the error of double counting.
...Exclusivity has necessarily been purchased from it, which means that the store has balanced
the inducement offered by Standard ... against the disadvantage of handling only Standard’s
patterns ... If consumers would prefer more pattern lines at higher prices, the store would not
accept Standard’s offer. The store’s decision, made entirely in its own interest, necessarily
reflects the balance of competing considerations that determine consumer welfare. Put the
matter another way. If no manufacturer used exclusive dealing contracts, and if a local retail
monopolist decided unilaterally to carry only Standard’s patterns because the loss in product
variety was more than made up in the cost saving, we would recognize that decision was in the
‘For a summary of federal exclusive dealing cases that reached at least the appellate level, s Frasco [1991].
1consumer interest. We do not want a variety that costs more than it is worth,.. If Standard
finds it worthwhile to purchase exclusivity..., the reason is not the barring of entry, but some
more sensible goal, such as obtaining the special selling effort of the outlet. ” [pp. 306-7]
In contrast to many other forms of vertical restrictions (such as resale price maintenance and
exclusive territories), exclusive dealing has received relatively little formal attention in the economics
literature (see, for example, Katz’s [1989] survey article; notable exceptions include Marvel [1982]
and Mathewson and Winter [1987] which we discuss below). In this paper, we seek both to provide a
conceptual framework for understanding this phenomenon and to explore more fully the motivations
for and effects of its use. Central to our approach is the view that exclusive dealing is best understood
by studying its costs and benefits relative to those of common representation, These settings of
common representation formally involve what we have previously termed situations of “common
agency” (Bernheim and Whinston [1986a, 1986b]). Exclusive dealing is an explicit choice by the
retailer and a manufacturer to avoid a setting of common agency.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes a general framework
in which a single retailer may represent two manufacturers. For a broad class of models encompassing
all of the specific settings considered in subsequent sections, we characterize the outcome of a
contracting game in which manufacturers may employ exclusive dealing provisions in their contracts.
A central implication of this characterization is that in these settings, unless common representation
introduces contracting externalities that reduce the manufacturers’ joint payoffs, the equilibrium
outcome is necessarilyy supportable through non-exclusive contracts.
In section 3, we specialize to a simple setting in which the retailer buys and resells the
manufacturers’ products and in which the retailers’ choices are perfect] y observable. The model
follows closely the scenario envisioned by Bork. We show that, in this setting, there are no relevant
contracting external ities associated with common representation. By applying our general
characterization results, we then obtain several strong conclusions supporting Bork’s assertions. First,
2the market outcome maximizes the profits of the vertical structure as a whole -- one obtains the fully
integrated solution. Second, in this equilibrium, each manufacturer earns exactly its contribution to
aggregate profits. Third, although this outcome need not be first-best, banning exclusive dealing
cannot raise welfare.
Despite these results, we argue that the model of section 3 may provide a poor framework for
understanding the effects of the exclusionary contracts that are observed in practice. In that model,
exclusionary provisions are entirely superfluous; even when the fully integrated solution would involve
the sale of only one product, this outcome can be supported through non-exclusionary contracts.
Indeed, in this model, there is also no reason to permit exclusive dealing.
Given that exclusivity provisions are superfluous in the model of section 3, it is natural to
investigate the circumstances under which these provisions serve a meaningful purpose.
Commentators have suggested a number of different motivations for the practice (see, for example, the
summaries in Areeda and Kaplow [1988] and Scherer [1980]). nose who are concernd about the
practice believe that it may be
power. A leading explanation
motivated by the desire to preempt outlets, and thereby enhance market
of those who see exclusive dealing as an efficient contractual device, on
the other hand, is that it may be motivated by a manufacturer’s desire to secure the special selling
effort of the retailer. As Scherer [1980] puts this view, “For manufacturers, exclusive dealing
arrangements are often appeal ing, because they ensure that their products will be merchandised with
maximum energy and enthusiasm. ”
indeed be given rigorous theoretical
of section 3.1
In sections 4 and 5, we show that these two explanations may
foundations by introducing suitable generalizations into the model
In section 4, we demonstrate that exclusive dealing can serve as a device for extracting rents
‘The other leading efficiency explanation is the manufacturer-free-trading story presented in Marvel [1982]. We discuss this
explanation briefly in section 5.
3(conceivably by extending market power) from markets other than the ones in which they are
employed. We refer to this phenomenon as a non-coincident market effect. In particular, we explore
the role of non-coincident market effects for an illustrative model in which retail markets develop
sequentially, and where important economies can be achieved only by serving more than one market.
We demonstrate that, as in section 3, effective exclusion occurs in the early-developing market
whenever it is jointly optimal for the manufacturers and retailer in this market. However, there are
two important differences from the analysis of section 3. First, although exclusion may be optimal for
the these three parties, it may not maximize vertical structure profits across the two retail markets; an
externality arises because exclusion may affect the degree of competition, and hence the profits of the
retailer, in the later-developing market. Second, it may be impossible to achieve the exclusionary
outcome in the absence of explicitly exclusionary provisions, precisely because the existence of non-
coincident effects may generate contracting external ities for the manufacturers. We derive a necessary
and sufficient condition describing the circumstances under which these provisions are used. In
addition, we examine the effects of banning explicit exclusion. We demonstrate that this does not
always end effective exclusion. Indeed, a ban may lead to effective exclusion continuing, but through
even less efficient practices such as quantity forcing or quantity discounts.2 Thus, the welfare
implications of a ban are ambiguous, even in the context of a model predicting foreclosure when
exclusive dealing is permitted.
In section 5, we study the potential for exclusive dealing to arise in circumstances where
common representation involves costly incentive conflicts. In particular, we imbed this conflict into
21nlight of this result, there are some notewonhy aspects of a raent lawsuit tiled by Virgin Atlantic Ainvays against British
Airways. While British Airways apparently has not attempled to engage any travel agent in an exclusive relationship, it has
offered travel agent commission override (or “TACO”) programs, which grant rebates if agents purchase high quantities or high
fractions of their customers’ travel services from British Airways. Virgin Aisways has alleged that these programs effectively
amount to exclusive dealing arrangements, and that they result in market forwlosure. See the decision of U.S. District Judge
Miriam Goldman Cedarbaum concerning British Airways’ motion for summary judgement, memorandum of Opinion and Order,
93 Civ. 7270( MGC), December 30, 1994.
4the model by assuming that the retailer takes unobsemable actions that influence the manufacturers’
sales, and that the retailer is risk-averse. We demonstrate that common representation may then
involve inefficiencies (resulting again from contracting externalities), and that this can lead to
exclusive dealing when these costs are large relative to the benefits from carrying a second product.
We explore the nature of these inefficiencies, and the precise circumstances in which exclusive dealing
arises. We also demonstrate that a ban on exclusive dealing may have surprisingly subtle effects. For
example, a ban can reduce welfare even in cases where no exclusion would have occurred.
Section 6 contains concluding remarks. All formal proofs are contained in the appendix.
2. The Contracting Model
In this section, we describe the contracting game that we employ throughout the paper and
provide an initial characterization result concerning its equilibria. The contracting game involves three
players: a retailer, who is assumed to have sole access to some set of consumers, and two
manufacturers ~ = A,B) who wish to sell their products to these consumers.
The contracting process consists of three stages:
m: Firms simultan~usly announce contract offers. A contract maps obse~able
outcomes (discussed later) to payments, which are made by the retailer to the manufacturer. Unless
legally prohibited from doing so, a firm may condition its contract terms on the set of manufacturers
whose products are sold by the retailer. Formally, we represent manufacturer j’s offer as a
contingent pair (y, ~). y is an exclusive contract, which applies if the retailer contracts only with
manufacturer j. y is a common contract, which applies if the retailer contracts with both
manufacturers. For now we shall simply denote the set of possible exclusive and common contracts
for manufacturer j by ~ and ~. We assume throughout that each set includes +, the choice not
to offer a contract of that type. If manufacturer j‘s offer is (y, *) the retailer can accept j‘s offer
only if he does not accept manufacturer -j’s offer.
5-: me retailer accepts or rejects each of tie two firms’ offers;
accepting the contingent pair (y, P;). The retailer’s payoff if he rejects both
while each manufacturer j (j= A,B) then earns r!.
accepting means
firms’ offers is UO,
-: If the retailer serves only manufacturer j, he chooses an element of tie set D; if he
serves both manufacturers, he chooses an action from the set ~. If the retailer selects actions & c ZJ
when serving only manufacturer j under contract Pj’ his payoff is uj(y, uj), manufacturer j earns
r~~, uj), and manufacturer i # j earns ~(P;, uj) (thus, we permit manufacturer i’s payoff to
depend on the contracting outcome between manufacturer j and the retailer). If the retailer chooses
& t Z’ when serving both manufacturers, his payoff is uc(P~, P:, d) and manufacturer j earns
m~(P~, P;, d), j = A,B. We denote the retailer’s (possibly non-unique) optimal choices in each of
these cases by bi(~) = argmaxd~ ~ d(q, uJ) and &(P~,P~) = argt?’iaxd. ~~,u’(P*, ~E, d).
We will be much more explicit about the nature of the sets @;, & , Ej, and Z’ and the
functions uj(0), u’(?), r~(”), T{(o), and T;(o) in the sections that follow. For the purposes of the
analysis in this section, however, we begin with four minimal assumptions. In stating them, we let
+ K denote the contract that differs from contract q only by the addition of a fixed payment K
from the retailer to manufacturer j. A similar meaning applies to the contract q + K,
(Al) ~~c~,then~+Ke~~orallKt Ratis=e,c.
(A2) Uc(pi + K>pi - K, UC)= uc(P~, P;, ~) ~or all K ~ R, (Pi, P;, d) c &~ x &; x D.
3While optimal choices may not exist for all
Formally, there are two possible ways to proceed.
feasible contracts, this has little effect on our characterization of quilibria.
First, one can impose sufficient technical restrictions on payoffs and contracts
to guarant- existence. Second, one could assume that, when an optimum fails to exist, the retailer follows some arbitrary rule
of thumb (e. g., he could do nothing, or could “satistice, - choosing randomly from among those contracts whose payoffs cannot
be exceeded by more than some amount t). The tirst approach rules out problematic subgames, while the second renders them
irrelevant. Both approaches lead to the same results.
6(A4) ti(P~ + K, uj) is a continuous, strictly increasing finction of K that is unbounded above and
below.
(A1) says that it is always possible to alter a feasible contract by demanding a larger (or
smaller) fixed payment from the retailer. (A2) says that the retailer does not care about the source of
his monetary earnings. It implies that &(P~ + K, P: - K) = &(P~, P:) for all K 6 R and
(P:, P;) 60: x Q;.
monetary earnings.
(A3) says that a manufacturer’s payoff increases dollar-for-dollar in his
(A4) implies that by altering P; by a fixed payment K it is possible to give the
retailer any desired level of utility.
In general, the model outlined above gives rise to multiple equilibria. We refine the set of
equilibria by focusing on those that are Pareto undominated for the manufacturers (the first-movers)
within the set of equilibria.4 As a general matter, we can classify equilibria according to whether
they are exclusive (involve the retailer contracting with only one manufacturer) or common (involve
the retailer contract ing with both manufacturers).
Consider, first, exclusive equilibria. If each manufacturer j sets P; = @, then bidding is
reduced to competition to obtain an exclusive relationship with the retailer. The outcome of this
(Bertrand-like) bidding game is that the exclusive relationship is obtained by the manufacturer who can
profitably offer the retailer the highest payoff level. Formally, define for U > ~ the function
Z(U)= Max ~(~,d)
P,- C@;, d
s.t. (i) uj E dj(~) (1)
(ii) d(~,uj) > U.
~(U) is the highest payoff level obtainable by manufacturer j in an exclusive relationship with the
%is is equivalent to requiring that equilibria be perfectly coalition-proof (see Bemheim, Peleg, and Whinston [1987).
7retailer when the retailer has reservation utility level U. It is necessarily non-increasing in U. We
can also define U(U) = max {T{(y,uj) I (~,uj) solves (1)] to be the maximal payoff of
manufacturer i # j when j has such an exclusive relationship. We then denote by ~(u) = ~(U)
+ ~(u) the maximal level of a~~re~ate manufacturer profits when manufacturer j has an optimal
exclusive contract with a retailer who has reservation utility level U.
If ~(U) and U(U) are continuous for j = A,B, i # j (as we assume below), then
exclusive equilibria always exist. In any exclusive equilibrium in which the retailer contracts with
manufacturer j, the retailer’s equilibrium payoff ~ must be such that ~(~) - 11~(~) 202
~@) - @(fi) (where i z j), Or equivalently, ~(~) ~ ~(fi) + z(~) ~ ~i(~). me best exclusive
equilibrium (for manufacturers) gives the retailer the payoff W = min {U: ~(u) - ~(u) < 0 for
some i and j # i}, and has profits of ~(Ue) for the manufacturer who is served, and ~~e) for
the excluded manufacturer.5
Now consider common equilibria (i. e., equilibria in which both manufacturers’ offers are
accepted). Lemma A. 1 in the appendix characterizes these equilibria in terms of an associated
intrinsic common agen~ game, which is the game that would arise were the agent only able to serve
both manufacturers or none at all (see Bernheim and Whinston [1986b]). Formally, one obtains this
game by imposing the restriction that @; = @ for j = A,B, and by assuming that the manufacturers
receive arbitrarily large negative payoffs if the retailer rejects boti offers. Henceforth, we let R(U)
denote the highest uggrega~e payoff earned by the two manufacturers in any equilibrium of an intrinsic
common agency game with retailer reservation utility U. We also denote by ~(u) C O; x P: x
E’ the subset of equilibria of the intrinsic common agency
generate aggregate profits for the manufacturers of W(U).
(P;, P:, ~) c E(U) then (P: + K, P; -K, d) c EC(U).
game with reservation utility level U that
Assumptions (A 1) - (A4) imply that if
‘In any such undominated quilibrium each manufacturer offers a contract that solves problem (1) when U = U.
8The models studied in Sections 3-5 share a feature that makes identification of undominated
equilibrium outcomes particularly simple. We introduce this condition as our fifth assumption:
(A5) ~ere exist constants @, ~f, H:, H:, H;) and a strictly increasing finction g(U) with
g(u”) = O such that, for all U > UO,&(U) = @ - g(U), Hj(U) = ~ - g(U) for j = A,B,
and @(U) = ~ for j = A,B, i # j,
Given (A5), for j = A,B we can also write ~(U) =~-g(U) where Hj=~+~. The
levels ~, H’, and HB are the maximal aggregate manufacturer profits that can be generated in
common and exclusive relationships, respectively, with a retailer who has a reservation utility level of
U = UO, Assumption (A5) says that the differences between the maximal aggregate manufacturer
profit levels in these types of relationships are independent of U.
The models in Sections 3-5 satisfy two further conditions that help us characterize equilibria.
The first pafl of condition (A6) says that some manufacturer earns greater profits in an exclusive
relationship with a retailer having reservation utility UOthan in the no-contracting outcome. This rules
out the existence of a no-contracting equilibrium. The second part of (A6) implies that the retailer’s
reservation utility constraint does not bind in a contracting equilibrium (see the expression for the
retailer’s payoff in proposition 2. 1). Condition (A7) says that each manufacturer earns weakly less
when its rival has an optimal exclusive relationship than in any other circumstance where its contract
is rejected. This condition is automatically satisfied whenever a manufacturer earns the same payoff
(e.g. zero) in any circumstance where its contract is rejected.
The following result characterizes the undominated equilibria of our contracting game:
9Proportion 2.1: Suppose that (A 1) - (A6) hold. In any undominated equilibrium of the
contracting model, manufacturer j (j = A,B) earns max {R, HA, HB} - H: (where i # j) and the
retailer receives a payofl of g-‘~~ + ~~ - max {k, II*, IIB}).
(i) If max {HA, ~B} > ~, then any undominated equilibrium involves the retailer
contracting with only one manufacturer j, with ~ = max {HA, HB}. ~e equilibrium
contract and retailer action (y, uj) solve (1) for U = g“l@ - ~. Moreover, if (A7)
holds, then no common equilibria exist in this case.
(ii) If k > max {HA, HB), then all undominared equilibria are common equilibria. ~e
equilibrium conrracts and retailer action choice (P~,P;,ti) are elements of the set
&(g”’(rI: + I-I:- fi)).
(iii) lf R = max {~A, HB}, fhen both types of equilibria described in (i) and (ii) arise as
undominated equilibria.
Proposition 2.1 tells us that the contracting outcome in any undominated equilibrium of a
model satisfying (A 1) - (A6) must correspond to the contracting structure that maximizes aggregate
manufacturer payoffs for any given level of retailer utility. Note that in the case in which utility is
transferable, so that g(U) = U for all U > 0, the equilibrium stticture is therefore also the one
that maximizes the aggregate payoff of the manufacturers and the retailer. Each manufacturer’s payoff
in this equilibrium is the difference between the aggregate manufacturer profit generated by this
structure and the profit that can be generated by the other manufacturer in an exclusive relationship.
Finally, suppose we define =’(u) = fic - g(U) to be the maximized joint profit in an intrinsic
common agency game with reservation utility U if the two manufacturers cooperated in their choice
of contracts (P;, P;). In many settings (including all of those considered in sections 3 through 5), it
is the case that ~ > Max {HA, HB} (e.g. as long as cooperating manufacturers can replicate an
exclusive outcome by having one manufacturer offer a prohibitively high price per unit). When this is
10so, Proposition-2. 1 tells us that a necessav condition for exclusive dealing to arise (uniquely) in an
—
undominated equilibrium is that ~ < ~: there must be some loss to the manufacturers arising from
externalities associated with the noncooperative offering of non-exclusive contracts.
3. The Simplest Model
We begin our analysis by studying the potential for exclusive dealing in the simplest possible
setting in
Bork. In
which it might arise. The model corresponds closely to the environment envisioned by
particular, we assume that the retailer directly controls the level of retail sales for each
manufacturer j, henceforth denoted xj. Thus, uj = xj, Ej =R+, & = (xA, x,), and~ = R:.
Manufacturer j can observe and verify xj, as well as the nature of j’s relation with the retailer
(exclusive or non-exclusive); however, j is unable either to observe or to verify the level of retail sales
made on behalf of manufacturer -j (x.j). Thus, each manufacturer can offer a contract that ties
monetary payments to its own sales, as well as to the nature of its relationship with the retailer, but
cannot tie payments to
map sales to monetary
Having chosen
sales of another manufacturer’s product.b It follows that the payment functions
transfers, P; : R+~R, s=c,e.
the levels of retail sales x = (xA,x~), the retailer receives revenues R(xA,x~)
(for convenience, we sometimes write R(xj,x.j)). Each manufacturer incurs production costs of cj(xj).
Thus, T;(P:, P;, x’) = P;(x; ) - Cj(x;), ~(P;, x;) = P;(x;) - Cj(x;), U’(P:, P;, x’) =
R(x;,x;) - P;(x;) - P;(x;), and uJ(P~, x~) = R(xj, O) - P~(x~) . It is easy to check that this
version of the general model satisfies (A1) through (A4). In addition, a manufacturer earns zero if the
retailer rejects its offer, and the retailer earns zero if it rejects both manufacturers’ offers. Hence m:
‘As shown in a previous version of this paper (Bemheim and Winston, 1992), our analysis is essentially unchanged when
one permits manufacturers to condition payments on each others’ sales. The central difference is that, under this alternative
assumption, manufacturers can always write nominally non-exclusive contracts that are equivalent to exclusive contracts (e.g.
by permitting the retailer to serve olher manufacturers, while penalizing the retailer heavily whenever the sales of another
manufacturer are positive). Thus, the alternative assumption obscures the formal distinction between exclusive and non-exclusive
contracts without adding to the substantive content of the problem.
11= m: = ~ = 0, and m~~, d) = O for all (~, Ui),i # j and j = A,B.
In this setting, a fully integrated vertical structure would choose to produce and sell
x - “ = (x; “ ,x; *) = argmaxXA,%R(xA, x,) - ~ Cj(xj) ,
j=A,B
which, for convenience only, we assume to be unique. On the other hand, were only product j
available, a vertically integrated firm consisting of the retailer and firm j would select




(Bl) R(x~, O) - CA(X~) > R(O, Xi) - C~(X~) > 0,
so that product A is the more profitable of the two products if only one of them can be sold.’ In
addition, we assume that the two products are substitutes, in the following sense:
(B2) R(x*”) _ CA(X~”) _ C~(X~”) < ~ [R(xj”, O) _ Cj(Xj* )].
j=A, B
Assumption (B2) implies that product j contributes less in incremental profits
sold than it does when it is the only product sold in the market.
when product -j is also
A. Analysis of equilibria
To apply the results of section 2, we must first characterize the functions Hj(u) and F(U),
Recall that xj- maximizes the joint profits attainable in an exclusive relationship between the retailer
and manufacturer j. Moreover,
the economic surplus associated
in an intrinsically exclusive setting, manufacturer j could extract all of
with this choice by writing a “forcing contract. ” The contract would
7 If the first inequality in (B]) holds with equality, all of our results continue to hold, but there are also exclusive equilibrium
(possibly dominated) in which B is served; see proposition 2.1.
12require the retailer to choose xj’, and would
participation constraint just binds. Since Q
specify a level of compensation such that the retailer’s
= O, it follows that
Hj(U) e H;(U) e R(xj” ,0) _ ci(xj”) _ U . (5)
Now consider an intrinsic common agency game with retailer utility U. Recall that x“
maximizes the joint profits attainable when the retailer represents both manufacturers. Thus,
R(U) < R(x l “) - CA(X1”) - c,(x; ”) - U - fi. In fact, there exist equilibria that achieve
this upper bound on ~(U); that is, for this simple model, there are no relevant contracting
externalities for the manufacturers. One such equilibrium involves forcing contracts: the payments to
A and B are set at a level that provides the retailer with reservation utility U conditional upon
choosing x-, and each firm j demands an infinite payment for any xjc * xj””, Another involves “sell-
out” contracts of the form Pjc(xj) = Fj + Cj(xj), which essentially transfer to the retailer the full
marginal returns from the sale of each product j in return for fixed payments Fj. It follows that:
~j
(B2)
ti(u) =R(x”*) -CA(X; *) -CB(X; ”) -U .
(6)
In light of equations (5) and (6), it is evident that (A5) is satisfied; simply take g(U) = U,
= ~~ = R(xj”, O) _ cj(xj”), and ~ = R(x” *) - c~(x~ “) - c~(x~ “). Moreover, @l) and
imply that (A6) is satisfied, and (A7) holds because a manufacturer whose contract is rejected
always earns zero. Thus, Proposition 2.1 holds. It follows immediately that undominated equilibria
always yield the outcome that maximizes the joint payoffs for the entire vertical structure (consisting
of the retailer and both manufacturers): the parties behave as if they were a single integrated firm.
Can exclusion arise in this context? Expressions (3), (4), and @l) imply ~ > HA > H’. If
x** # X*, then fi > HA and the equilibrium outcome necessarily entails positive sales on behalf of
both manufacturers (proposition 2.1, part (ii)). If x -- = X*, then R = II* and manufacturer B
makes no sales in equilibrium. However, in that case, even a fully integrated firm would find it
13optimal to refrarn from selling B’s product. Moreover, this outcome can be sustained in a common
equilibrium (Proposition 2.1 part (iii)); formal contractual exclusion of manufacturer B is superfluous.
We summarize the implications of proposition 2.1 in the following result:
Proposition 3.1: In any undominated equilibrium, the retailer chooses x“-,manufacturer j
[ earns its marginal contribution tojoint profits, R( x l *) _ CA(X~-) - CB(X~”)] - [R(O>X~) _ c.j(x-~ )],
and the retailer earns ~ [R(xj- ,0) – cj(xj- )] – [R(x - “ ) - CA(X; l ) – c~(x~ - )].
j=A, B
a common equilibrium yielding this undominated outcome.
Thus, undominated equilibria always maximize the joint payoffs of the retailer




manufacturer B, this outcome can always be achieved through non-exclusionary contracts.
B. Policy implications
For the simple model considered in this section, our analysis substantially corroborates Bork’s
[1978] argument (quoted in the introduction) that exclusive dealing cannot be used profitably to
foreclose a rival from a market. Because each manufacturer must effectively compensate the retailer
to attract him to an exclusive dealing contract, manufacturers internalize the retailer’s cost from the
loss in product variety arising under exclusivity. As a result, the market outcome is exactly that
which would arise with a fully integrated vertical structure. Indeed, just as Bork asserts, in
equilibrium each manufacturer extracts a profit exactly equal to the incremental value of its product.
In light of our results, it is surprising that, using a model similar to ours in many respects,
Mathewson and Winter [1987] obtain strikingly different results. In their model, producers offer
wholesale contracts to the retailer on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. These contracts specify a wholesale
price and possibly an exclusive dealing requirement. In Mathewson and Winter’s model, exclusive
dealing arises as the unique equilibrium outcome for a range of parameter values (when it does arise,
14exclusive dealing may either raise or lower welfare relative to the non-exclusive outcome).
The key difference between our model and that of Mathewson-Winter concerns the set of
feasible contracts.s In our notation, Mathewson and Winter only allow contracts of the form
P;(xj) ‘ w~xj and p~(xj) = Wjcxj for constants Wje and Wjc. These restrictions create contracting
externalityies for the manufacturers, and Iargel y account for the differences between our findings. Even
the flexibility to charge fixed fees would, in a broad range of circumstances, restore our results. The
importance of fixed fees is easily understood in the context of Bork’s argument. If a manufacturer
insists on exclusivity, it must compensate the retailer for the loss of surplus associated with selling
other products. If a fixed fee is not available, then the manufacturer can only compensate the retailer
by reducing its wholesale price. However, this form of compensation alters the retailer’s incentives
on the quantity margin; its value to the retailer is therefore less than its cost to the manufacturer.
Proposition 3.1 implies that the retailer and manufacturers act as an integrated unit. However,
in contrast to Bork’s assertion, it does not follow that the equilibrium maximizes social surplus unless
the retailer is able to extract all of consumer surplus (say, through perfect price discrimination). From
a social perspective, the fully integrated solution can involve the production of either too many or too
few products and inefficient retail pricing.’ Nevertheless, in this model, Bork is correct in asserting
that a ban on exclusive dealing cannot promote social welfare. Formally, we model this prohibition as
the restriction that Pjc(~j) = Pje(xj), so that manufacturer j is prevented from conditioning
compensation on the retailer’s decision to serve -j. The following result demonstrates that a
There are also some differences in the timing of decisions. In MaLhewson and Winter, bolh firms first decide whether to
insist on exclusivity; if either does, then both compete in the offering of exclusive contracts (otherwise, the retailer sells the
products of both manufacturers). However, if we were to change the timing of contract offers in our model while retaining
flexibility in the form of the contracts, the basic conclusions of our analysis would be unaltered.
‘For example, consider the case where demand for the products is almost completely independent. If a monopolist can only
offer simple per unit prices to consumers, then it has too little incentive to carry each product individually. In contrast, if the
monopolist can bundle multiple products, introducing a second product may increase profits by more than the consumer surplus
it generates (this would certainly be true if by bundling it could fully extract consumer surplus). S= Tirole [1988, pp. 104-5].
15prohibition on exclusionary contracts leaves the equilibrium outcome unaffected.’0
Proposition 3.2: Suppose that manufacturers are restricted to ofer contracts satisfying
P:(xj) = P;(xj). men there is an equilibrium in which the retailer accepts both manufacturers’
contracts, chooses x*”,and payofs are exactly as in proposition 3.1. Funhermore, this equilibrium
weakly dominates for the manufacturers) any other equilibrium of this game.11
Although propositions 3.1 and 3.2 appear to confirm much of Bork’s reasoning, in one
important sense they fail to do so: exclusionary provisions are superfluous in this model. Whether
exclusionary provisions are permissible has no effect on undominated equilibrium outcomes, which are
always achievable through non-exclusionary contracts, even when one manufacturer is effectively
excluded (i.e. makes no sales). Hence, in this model, there is no reason either to ban or not to ban
these arrangements. Thus, the present model may provide a poor framework for understanding the
effects of the excltts~onary contracts that are observed in practice. In the next two sections, we turn
our attention to models in which exclusionary provisions serve a meaningful purpose.
4. Exclusive dealing with non-coincident market effects
One frequently cited mot ive for exclusive dealing is the desire to create or enhance market
power. Yet in the model of section 3, no such effect could occur: The equilibrium market outcome
always maximized the total profits of the vertical structure, and it achieved effective exclusivity (where
jointly efficient) without any explicit exclusionary provisions.
10Proposition 3.2 does not follow directly from proposition 3.1, despite the fact that undo minatcd equilibria nd never
employ exclusive contracts. As a formal matter, the prohibition on exclusionary contracts changes the nature of manufacturers’
strategies, and could in principle subtly alter their incentives.
llO.Bnen and Shaffer [199 I] analyze a model (hat is equivalent to this restrict~ game. They show that in any equilibrium
of this restricted game, the quantities chosen by the retailer (x;, x; ) must satisfy
[ ~“ = argma~, R(xj, x;) - CJ(XJ) - C+( x;)] for j = A,B. Thus, if integrated protits are strictly concave, all equilibria result
in x- being chosen.
16Thus far, however, we have confined our attention to a single set of vertically related parties,
considered in isolation. Commentators have also expressed concern that the exclusion of competitors
from one market might enhance a firm’s power in other markets. In this section, we show that the
concern over what we shall call non-coincident market effects does indeed have a valid theoretical
foundation: When such effects are introduced into the model of section 3, exclusive dealing may arise
in an undominated equilibrium precisely because of its ability to etiance market power.
We explore the role of non-coincident market effects for an illustrative model in which two
retail markets develop sequentially, and where important economies can be achieved only by serving
more than one market. tz As in section 3, effective exclusion occurs whenever it is jointly optimal for
the manufacturers and the retailer in the first market. Unlike section 3, however, exclusion may be
jointly optimal for these pat-ties precisely because it reduces competition in the Iaterdeveloping retail
market. Moreover, when exclusion is optimal for these parties it may be impossible to achieve this
outcome in the absence of explicit exclusionary provisions. In addition, we examine the effects of
banning explicit exclusion. We demonstrate that this does not always end effective exclusion. Indeed,
in the presence of a ban, effective exclusion may be achieved through even less efficient practices.
A. The model
We suppose that initially there is a single retail market (market 1), served by a single retailer
(retailer 1). With time, however, another retail market (market 2), again served by a single retailer
(retailer 2), becomes viable. Manufacturers and retailers can enter into long-term contracts. Thus,
prior to the emergence of market 2, manufacturers can enter into contracts with retailer 1 that govern
sales made after the emergence of market 2. Manufacturers cannot, however, contract with retailer 2
for sales in market 2 until this second market emerges, The important feature of this setting is that the
IzSimilar “on.coin~ident market effects can arise in other contexts, for example when an exclusive contract betw~n a
manufacturer and a retailer reduces competition for the manufacturer’s inputs.
17manufacturers can contract with retailer 1 for future sales before retailer 2 comes on the scene. To
isolate this effect, we suppress all sales in market 1 that occur prior to the emergence of market 2 (one
can easily make earlier sales explicit at the expense of some additional notation).
Competition between the two manufacturers unfolds in three phases. In phase 1, they engage
in a contracting game with retailer 1. As in section 3, the manufacturers offer contracts, and the
retailer then chooses contracts and quantities. Production, however, does not occur until phase 3.’3
Retailer 1‘s has a continuous revenue function R,(xAl,x~,), where xj~ denotes manufacturer j’s sales
to retailer n. In phase 2, each manufacturer j has the opportunity to make invest of fixed sum (<) in
cost reduction. If the investment is made, j produces output at a unit cost of cj. If j forgoes this
investment, unit costs are instead cj + 6j, where ~j > 0. In phase 3, having observed each other’s
investment decisions, the two manufacturers engage in a contracting game with retailer 2 (as in section
3). Retailer 2’s revenue function is R,(xA,,x,2 ). Finally, production is carried out and the retailers
make the payments required by their contracts. As in section 3, a retailer earns zero if it accepts no
contracts, and a manufacturer earns zero in any market where the retailer rejects its contract.
For the sake of simplicity, we focus on the case where KA = 6A = O, and b~ = + m. In
other words, we assume that manufacturer A has no further opportunities to reduce cost, and that
manufacturer B cannot produce at all unless the investment is undertaken. These assumptions imply
that A may be able to eliminate competition from B in market 2 by excluding B from market 1.
However, B does not have a symmetric incentive to exclude A from market 1.
It is convenient to define for each market n = 1,2 the profit levels
~= max X{Rn(x) - CAXA - CBXB} ,
and
‘The retailer’s choice of quantifies can also be delayed without affecting the conclusions, but the game is somewhat easier
to solve if this decision is made immediately.
18~ . njn = Max ,,{Rn(xj,O) - Cjxj} ,
As in section 3, these would be the joint payoffs from common and exclusive outcomes, were only
market n to exist. In parallel to our notation in section 3, we denote the (unique) solutions to these
maximizations by (x~~,x~l), and x;. O = A,B) respective y, and assume that these quantities are
strictly positive. We also assume that (B2) holds in each market, so LA + ~’ > fin for n = 1, 2.




These conditions are easily interpreted, Condition (C 1) states that manufacturer B’s contribution to
total profit in market 2 is positive, but strictly less than B’s required investment. Since B’s profits in
market 2 (gross of K~ and conditional upon having invested in phase 2) are given by the middle term
in expression (Cl) (see proposition 3. 1), this condition implies that, if excluded from market 1, B will
neither invest in phase 2 nor compete against A in market 2 during phase 3; thus, (Cl) creates the
potential for a non-coincident market effect. Condition (C2) states that the joint payoffs for retailer 1
and the two manufacturers are higher if B is excluded from market 1 (given B’s subsequent decision
not to participate in market 2), than if B makes sales to retailer 1. The intuition developed in section
3 suggests that this condition is required to generate effectively exclusive outcomes in market 1.
Condition (C3) indicates that, if retailer 2’s profits are also considered, aggregate profits are
maximized when B participates. To the extent the retailers practice perfect price discrimination, this
implies that B’s participation is socially desirable, and that B’s exclusion from market 1 is inefficient.
(B2) implies that if (C2) is violated then (C3) holds, but the converse is not true.
19We assume throughout that (C 1) and (C3) are satisfied, and we investigate the properties of
equilibria contingent upon whether (C2) holds.
B. Equilibrium exclusion
To solve for equilibria, we begin with phase 3. If B has chosen to invest in phase 2, then
phase 3 payoffs for manufacturer j are given by ~ - ~, i * j (see part (ii) of proposition 2. 1). If B
has chosen not to invest, then manufacturer A faces no competition in market 2. In that case, A
extracts all of the potential rents from retailer 2, earning ~A.
Next consider the phase 2 investment decision of manufacturer B. If retailer 1 has chosen a
positive quantity for B (x~l > O), manufacturer B certainly invests (otherwise B would incur infinite
losses since its contract would require it to produce x~l at infinite costs). If retailer 1 has an exclusive
relationship with A or has simply chosen x~, = O, then B chooses not to invest (given (Cl) and part
(ii) of proposition 2. 1).
Finally, consider the phase 1 contract offers by manufacturers A and B to retailer 1. Note that
the phase 1 problem can be treated as the type of game considered in section 2, provided that we
define payoffs appropriately to reflect outcomes on the equilibrium continuation paths. In particular,
we can solve the phase 1 contracting problem with retailer 1 by studying an equivalent single market
model, in which the costs of manufacturers A and B are given by
CA(XAI ! XBI ) = CAXA,- I-I; - 1(X,, > o)~ - H: - n:)
and
CB(XBL)= CBXB1 - 1(x,, > 0)(~ - n:- K,) ,
where the indicator function I(x~l > O) equals unity when x~l > 0, and zero otherwise.
Note that this equivalent single market model differs from the class considered in section 3 in
one important respect: A’s implicit “costs” depend upon B’s production, as well as A’s production.
20However, this model satisfies the assumptions needed to apply Proposition 2.1 ((A1)-(A7)), with
u“ =o, m:=rI;,7r:=o,
The last inequality above reflects the fact that the cooperative common outcome in this setting
depends on whether (C2) is satisfied. When (C2) holds, it involves quantities of (x~,, O) in market 1
and a joint payoff to the manufacturers of HA = H? + ~~, while when (C2) is reversed (strictly),
the cooperative common outcome involves quantities of (x~~,x~~) in market 1 and a joint payoff to
the manufacturers of ~ + ~ (~- - Hi) - KB. The maximal level of joint profits in a
noncooperative equilibrium of this intrinsic common agency game, R, is bounded above by ~.
—
Note that when (C2) holds we have HA = fic > k, and the cooperative common outcome in
market 1 involves quantities of (x~l,O). Hence, by Proposition 2.1, any undominated equilibrium of
the contracting game must involve quantities in market 1 of (x~l, O) (i.e. an undominated equilibrium
must either be exclusive, or be a common equilibrium that implements (X:l, O)). Exclusion of
manufacturer B from market 1 is jointly efficient for retailer 1 and the two manufacturers because the
joint loss in market 1 from reduced variety, m; - H:), is more than made up by the joint gain
arising from reduced competition in market 2,
[ 1 ~f -~(q -Hi) -K, . These gains reflect
j
the more effective expropriation of rents from retailer 2, who loses ~~ + H: - ~). Thus, exclusion
14 These “alue~ ~eflect our simplifying assumption that retailer 1 has only one opportunityto contractWith[he‘manufacturers,
If, instead, rejection of both the manufacturers’ offers in phase 1 results in another contracting opportunity for retailer 1 in phase
3, then the values of m:, r~, and UO would be altered, but our conclusions would be unaltered.
21can be attractive in this model precisely because of anticompetitive effects in a non-coincident market.
In contrast, if (C2) is reversed (strictly), then ~ > HA and the cooperative common
outcome involves quantities of (x~~, x~~) # (x~l,O). Moreover, it can be verified that (x~~, x~~) is
sustainable in this case as an intrinsic common agency game equilibrium outcome through forcing
contracts, and so fi = tic. Proposition 2.1 therefore implies that any
contracting model in this case is a common equilibrium with quantities
We summarize these conclusions in the following proposition:
undominated equilibrium of the
in market 1 of (x~~, xJ;),
Proposition 4,1: Men (C2) holds, all undominated equilibria involve eflective exclusion of
manufacturer B@om markt 1 (i.e. x~l =
undominated equilibrium involves efective
Of course, as we have emphasized
effective exclusion and explicit exclusion.
O). Men the inequality in (C2) is (strictly) reversed, no
exclusion of manufacturer Bfrom market 1.
in section 3, there is an important distinction between
Indeed, for the single market setting of section 3, we found
that explicit exclusionary provisions were superfluous: whenever exclusion was jointly optimal for the
retailer and the two manufacturers, this could be achieved through a common equilibrium. However,
the logic of that finding depended critically on the assumption that A’s costs are independent of B’s
sales. This assumption permitted the firms to support (x: ,O) using “sell out” contracts that
transferred all residual variation in profits, without violating the restriction that a common contract
cannot condition compensation on the sales of a rival. In the current context, A’s implicit “costs”
(CA(XA1,X,,))do depend upon B’s sales; thus, absent an ability to condition compensation on B’s sales,
A cannot transfer all residual profit variation to retailer 1. This implies that contracts between retailer
1 and B may impose externalities on A.
In particular, when (C2) holds, a deviation from the jointly efficient outcome, (x~, O), may
benefit retailer 1 and manufacturer B precisely because positive sales for B impose a negative
22external ity on A.
this question, we
When will this externality be of sufficient size to justify the deviation? To answer
define the following set:
(
D = X,l I max.,, [R,(XA, ,xB, 1 }
) - CBXB,+ l(x,l > O)@ - II: - K,) < R,(xA,, O) .
In other words, XA1E D if and only if retailer 1 and manufacturer B cannot jointly benefit by
arranging a deviation from (x~l,O) to (xAl,x~l) for any x~l > 0. Henceforth, we will refer to D as the
deterrence set. One would expect to observe explicit exclusionary practices whenever x~l @D, since
in this case ~ < ~ = HA. This intuition is confirmed in the following result:
Proportion 4.2: Men (C2) holds, undominated equilibria necessarily involve an explicit
exclusive dealing provision if and only ;~x~l @D.
Note the implications of this result: when (C2) holds and x~l & D, retailer 1 agrees to an
explicitly exclusive arrangement with manufacturer A in order to enhance A’s market power in a non-
coincident market. The retailer is willing to enter into this arrangement because the exclusive contract
provides the retailer with a sufficiently large share of the incremental surplus extracted in the non-
coincident market. Given (C3), this outcome is inefficient, in the sense that it fails to maximize total
retailer and producer surplus, Even under the assumption that retailers can perfectly price
discriminate (which, as explained in the last section, is implicit in Bork’s analysis), exclusive dealing
depresses social welfare.’5 Our analysis therefore provides a theoretical foundation for the concern
l~lronicallY, in the ~b~ence of ~rfwt price discrimination by retailers, it is at least conceivable that eXclusive d=ling could
raise social welfare through indirect effects on consumer surplus.
23that market foreclosure through exclusive dealing can be anticompetitive. ‘d
C. The effects of banning exclusive dealing
The preceding section raises the possibility that, under certain circumstances, exclusive dealing
can be characterized as an anticompetitive practice with adverse consequences for social welfare. This
observation suggests a potential role for antitrust policy. One possibility would be to impose a ban on
exclusive dealing, which we model as in section 3. However, as we now show, when an inefficient
market outcome arises that involves exclusive dealing, the welfare effects of such a ban are
ambiguous; it may make things even worse.
To develop intuition, we begin by assuming that (C2) holds. Thus, in the absence of a ban on
exclusionary practices, the equilibrium necessarily involves effective exclusion. If, in addition,
x~l lD, then it is possible to achieve effective exclusion without an explicit contractual restriction.
For this case, it is natural to conjecture that a ban an explicit exclusionary practices would be
irrelevant. Of greater interest is the case where x~l @ D. Without a ban, equilibrium involves
explicit exclusion. However, it does not necessarily follow that the imposition of a ban would end
effective exclusion of manufacturer B. Although it is impossible in this case to sustain an effectively
exclusive equilibrium wherein A produces x~l it may nevertheless be possible to achieve an
exclusionary outcome through the use of a contract that induces retailer 1 to choose some ‘*1 ~ D.
Based on the intuition developed in the preceding sections, one might expect to obtain such an
outcome as long as the joint profits for retailer 1, manufacturer A, and manufacturer B exceed the
joint profits received by these parties when B makes strictly positive sales in market 1.
l~he inefficiency of [he equilibrium outcome raises the possibility that renegotiation would alter our central results. Imagine,
for example, that all retailers and manufacturers can jointly renegotiate phase 1 contracts at the beginning of phase 3, and that
after retailer 1 and manufacturer A have entered into an exclusive relation in phase 1, B has nevertheless invested in phase 2.
Retailer 1 and manufacturer A should be willing to renegotiate their contract to permit sales by B. However, B will typically
share the surplus gained through renegotiation with these parties. If B’s share is sufficiently small, even the anticipation of
renegotiation will fail to justify investment by manufacturer B once A has consummated an exclusive contract with retailer 1.
Thus, as long as B’s bargaining power is not too great, exclusive dealing emerges exactly as in proposition 4.2.
24Following this intuition, we define:
iA, [ = argmax,,, G D ‘I(XAI ~0) - CAXA1 ]
Retailer 1 and manufacturer A receive higher joint profits in market 1 from iA1 than from any other
output level in the deterrence set D. Effective exclusion of B through selection of iAl maximizes the
total profits of retailer 1 and borh manufacturers whenever
(C4)
Note that when x~l G D, we have ‘*I = x~l, which implies that (C4) and (C2) are equivalent.
When x~l @D, condition (C4) is more demanding than (C2).
With one additional technical assumption, i’ it is possible to prove the following result:
Proposition 4.3: men (C4) holds and exclusive dealing is banned, there is an effectively
exclusive equilibrium with sales in markt 1 of (‘Al, 0). Fu~he~ore* this is the only equilibrium
The second half of proposition 4.3 requires clarification. For previous results, we have
refined the set of equilibria by applying a payoff-dominance criterion. Unfortunately, this criterion
does not isolate a unique outcome in the current instance.lB However, according to the proposition,
any such equilibrium necessarily has the feature that, for some out-of-equilibrium level(s) of x~l,
manufacturer B’s offer, P~l(x~l), fails to cover the true incremental costs that B incurs in producing
x~l. In such cases, B’s equilibrium contract offer is weakly dominated by another contract that covers
“Specifically, detine D’ analogously to D, replacing < with <. Assume that D = CIOS(D+).
l~ile effectively exclusive equilibria are Pareto ranked (with first period sales of (iAl, O) generating the dominant result),
we believe it is possible in some instances to construct common equilibria that give manufacturer B positive payoffs in market
1, in which case the payoff-dominance criterion cannot rule out some non-exclusive equilibria.
25incremental costs in all instances. The exclusive equilibrium does not suffer from this problem.
Note the implications of proposition 4.3. Suppose that condition (C2) is satisfied, and that
x~l E D. Proposition 4,2 tells us that, when exclusive dealing is permitted, (x~l ,0) is in fact
sustainable without explicit exclusion. By proposition 4.3, the same outcome is sustainable once
exclusive deal ing is banned (recall that x~l ~ D implies iA1 = x~l, which in turn -- given (C2) --
implies (C4)). Thus, as one would expect, a ban on exclusive dealing does not deter non-explicit
exclusion. Next, suppose that (C2) is satisfied, but that x~l @D. Proposition 4.2 tells us that, when
exclusive dealing is permitted (x~l ,0) will be sustained through explicitly exclusionary provisions.
In such cases, (C4) may or may not hold. Proposition 4.3 tells us that, when (C4) does not hold, the
ban on exclusive dealing fails to end B’s exclusion. Rather, it induces A to engage in non-explicit
exclusion by inducing retailer 1 to purchase enough output from A to render B’s participation
unprofitable. That is, explicit exclusion is replaced by implicit exclusion through quantity forcing or
quantity discounts. .The welfare consequences of this response are ambiguous. If retailer 1 practices
perfect price discrimination (as assumed implicitly by Bork), social welfare declines. If retailer 1 is
instead a conventional non-discriminating monopolist, the increase in A’s output may enhance welfare
(unless deterrence of B requires A’s output to be sufficiently excessive from a social perspective).
Proposition 4.3 does not imply that a ban on explicit exclusion is always ineffective. Indeed,
the following result identifies conditions under which the intended effect materializes.
Proposition 4.4: When the inequality in (C4) is (strictly) reversed and exclusive dealing is
banned, there is an equilibrium in which both manufacturers’ contracts are accepted, and sales in
market 1 are (x~~,x~~) > 0. Furthermore, all undominated equilibria have x~l > 0.
Note that, in this case, the payoff-dominance criterion isolates equilibria in which
manufacturer B is not excluded from market 1. We have not established that this criterion uniquely
26selects (x~~,x~~). However, if one assumes that joint payoffs in market 1 are strictly concave in
(xA,,x,,) when x,, > 0, it is easy to verify that this is the unique undominated equilibrium outcome.
To understand the implications of proposition 4.4, begin by assuming that (C2) holds, but that
(C4) does not (this requires x~, @ D). According to proposition 4.2, explicit exclusion will emerge
when exclusive dealing is permitted. Proposition 4.4 implies that the imposition of a ban ends
effective exclusion, as intended. Since (C4) implies (C2), proposition 4.4 also indicates that, in the
presence of a ban on exclusive dealing, non-exclusionary outcomes will emerge when (C2) fails. This
is not very surprising, since the failure of (C2) leads to non-exclusive outcomes in the absence of a
ban (see proposition 4.1 ). However, this does not mean that the ban is irrelevant in such cases.
Indeed, in the course of proving proposition 4.4, we isolate a condition under which the imposition of
a ban on exclusive dealing shifts payoffs from retailer 1 to manufacturer B (see the appendix for
details). In essence, the impossibility of explicit exclusion may improve B’s ability to extract rents
from retailer 1, even in cases where the original equilibrium does not involve exclusion.
Our findings
dealing is permitted,
can be summarized as follows. If outcomes are non-exclusive when exclusive
they remain non-exclusive once a ban is imposed. However, payoffs may shift
from retailer 1 to manufacturer B. If non-explicit exclusion arises when exclusive dealing is
permitted, it will also emerge when a ban is imposed. Finally, if explicit exclusion occurs when
exclusive dealing is permitted, a ban can lead to either of two results. In some cases, it ends
exclusivity, as intended. But in other cases, explicit exclusion is replaced by implicit exclusion,
achieved through a contract that induces the retailer to sell so much of A’s output that B’s participation
is rendered unprofitable. In these cases, a ban on exclusive dealing may raise or lower social welfare.
5. Exclusive Dealing as a Consequence of Incentive Conflicts
In Section 4 we saw how introducing non-coincident market effects into the model of Section 3
could produce exclusive dealing in equilibrium. A commonly expressed alternative view of exclusive
27dealing, however, is that it arises in response to a manufacturer’s fear that common representation
would subject the retailer to conflicting incentives. In this section, we show how exclusive dealing
can indeed arise when problems of incentive provision are introduced into the model of Section 3.
A. The model
We focus here on one possible form of incentive conflict at the retail level by considering a
situation in which the retailer chooses non-verifiable prices for each of the products he carries.lg We
denote the retail price of product j by pj for j = A,B. When both products are carrid by the
retailer, price choices of (pA, p~) lead to a stochastic realization of demand for each product j,
given by xj = Oqj(p., p,). where d c R+ is a non-negative random variable with distribution
function *(O). We adopt the normalization that E(6) = 1, so that qJ@*, p,) represents
manufacturer j’s expected sales level given retail prices (PA, p~).
the retailer and its retail price is pj, its sales are xi = Oqj@j, m).
When only firm j is carried by
Manufacturer j‘s production
costs are cj per unit, and for simplicity we assume that the retailer’s only costs are the costs of
acquiring products from the manufacturers. We also assume that ~(cj, m) > 0 for j = A,B.
As before, each manufacturer j is restricted to offer contracts that condition compensation on
sales of manufacturer j’s product, but not on sales for manufacturer -j or on the retailer’s chosen
prices. Moreover, we restrict these payments to be linear in own sales (actual incentive contracts
often have this relatively simple structure; for one formal justification, see Rey-Tirole [1986]).
@~ = ~ = {pj(o): There exist Fj and ~j such that Pj(xj) = Fj + ~jxj for all Xj >
Thus,
o).
We assume also that the retailer maximizes expected utility and has a Bernoulli utility function
‘~or example, the true price charged by a new car dealer is often unverifiable bwause of trade-ins. The retailer’s price
choice in this model could also be interpreted as the choice of a non-obsewable level of service that has a monetary value to
customers equal to its cost of provision. In any case, the basic points develo@ below hold for much more general kinds of non-
observable marketing choices.
28of the constant “absolute risk-aversion form, u(w) = 1 - e-w, where a > 0. The constant absolute
risk aversion assumption makes the model conform to assumption (A5).m The assumption of
positive risk-aversion (a > O) causes the provision of incentives to be costly in the model (i. e., the
first-best is not attainable) and thereby introduces the possibility of externalities in incentive provision
across manufacturers. FinalIy, as in section 3, a manufacturer earns zero if his contract is not
accepted, and the retailer earns zero if he rejects both manufacturers’ offers. With this assumption,
the model satisfies (A6) and (A7) (qj(cj, w ) >0 implies ~ > O).
Before proceeding, we should stress that although we focus on a model of moral hazard
risk-aversion here, similar points could be established in other types of models involving costly
incentive provision, For example, Marvel’s [1982] (informal) explanation for exclusive dealing
with
in
terms of protecting manufacturer quasi-rents can be viewed formally as an example of double moral
hazard (manufacturers advertise, while the risk-neutral retailer can switch consumers among brands).
Like our model of moral hazard with risk-aversion, the double moral hazard model involves costly
incentive provision and can be shown to generate similar results.2L’ n
In our model, if the retailer accepts both manufacturers’ contracts and faces contract terms





it chooses retail prices to solve
(pj ‘$)”qj(p*, p~) ‘j~B F~)d@(~).
Hence, its optimal price choices maximize ~ (p]-B~)q](pA>p~). Letting [p.4(qA,q~)? PB(%, qB)]
j =A, B
denote the inVerSe Of the fUnCtiOn [qA@*, PB), q~@A, pB)], we can eCJUiVa]entlY think Of the retailer as
%pecitically, we have g(U) = -(1/a)ln(l - U)
ZISimilar ~ffwt~ ~I~oarise in settings in which the retailer possesses hidden information and faces either an interim individual
rationality constraint or is risk-averse. See Martimofi [fofihcoming] and Stole [1990].
%iven this fact and the results below, it is surprising that Marvel [1982, pp. 3-4] argues against the view that exclusive
dealing is a device to obtain increased dealer promotional effort.
29choosing the mean sales levels of the two goods, ~ and ~ (recall that E(O) = 1) to maximize the
function R(qA, q,; 6;,~;)= ~ [pj(q., q~)-fllqj on the set Q = {(~, ~~) ~ There exist
j=A,B
(PA,pB) such that qj@A, PB) = ~ for j = A, B}. For technical simplicity, we assume that Q = R:
(e.g., there exist retail prices (pA, p,) that generate zero sales for either product, or both, with
certainty). We make the following standard assumption:
@l) R(”) is twice continuously dl~erentiable and strictly concave in (~, q,), and
dR(0)/~~ ~qB < () at afl (~, qB) >0.
Under (D1), the mean sales levels induced by contract terms [(F:, 61), (F:, D;)] are given by
some continuously differentiable functions q~(d~, ~~j), j =A,B, which are nonincreasing in ~ and
nondecreasing in ~~j, and strictly so at any (d:, ~;) such that
[qi(&A? 6;), qi(~:> 6;)1 >> 0.
If, instead, the retailer accepts on]y manufacturer j‘s contract (y, ~), similar logic implies
that it chooses qi to maximize R(qj, O; ~J, O) . Given (D 1), the solution is a non-increasing,
continuously differentiable function q;(~) that is strictly decreasing at any ~; at which q~@) > 0.
B. Equilibrium behavior
Since the model described above satisfies (A 1) - (A7), Proposition 2.1 once again applies.
Recall from our discussion in Section 2 that ~ < ~ is a necessary condition for exclusive dealing to
arise in all undominated equilibria: equilibria in the intrinsic common agency game must involve some
inefficiency. The next result shows that, under assumption (D 1), this condition always holds when the
cooperative outcome involves positive expected sales levels of both products.
Proposition 5.2: Suppose that (D1) holds and fhar [(F;, d:), (F;, B;)] maximizes fhe
manufacturers’ joint profits in the intrinsic common agency setting with retailer reservation utility
30u = O. men, -~ [GW;, B;), q:u~, 6~)1 >>0, [T:, BJ, (F;, ~~)1
the intrinsic common agen~ game. Hence, if all cooperative contracts
for both manufacturers, then R < ~.
is not a Nash equilibrium of
involve positive expected sales
Proposition 5.1 follows because the presence of retailer risk-aversion makes incentive
provision costly and leads the cooperative contracts to involve some risk-sharing between the retailer
and each manufacturer j; that is, to have (@j*- Cj) > 0. But, as a result of the fact that ~~ - Cj)
> 0, contracting externalities are present across the manufacturers; if manufacturer -j lowers ~.j, this
causes the retailer to reduce qj and lowers manufacturer j’s expected profits.x
The fact that R < F creates the possibility for exclusive dealing to arise in equilibrium.
Indeed, recall from Proposition 2.1 that whenever k < max {II*, IIB} no common equilibria exist--
all equilibria are exclusive. Thus, if max {HA, HE} is close to F we can expect exclusive dealing to
arise; intuitively, the gain from having both products available were the manufacturers to cooperate in
incentive provision is small relative to the loss due to incentive conflicts.
To see this more concretely, consider the limiting case in which products A and B are
perfect substitutes with identical costs c* = cE = c. It is evident that in this case ~A = ~B = ~,
Hence, as long as fi < 7, exclusive dealing must arise in this case. We cannot use Proposition
5.1 directly here because (D 1) is violated in the limiting case of perfect substitutes. However, the
following result identifies general conditions under which exclusion prevails.
Proposition 5.2: Consider the case of petfect substitutes with identical costs of production.
Assume that R(qj, O;~j, O) is twice continuously di~erentiable and strictly concave in q at all
qi ~ O. ~en in any exclusive equilibrium (as well as in thejointly optimal common contract) ~ >
‘When the retailer is risk-neutral, Lhe derivations in the proof of proposition 5,1 (see Lhe appendix), can be used to show
that (BJ - Cj) = O for j = A,B. Hence, the cooperative contracts are sell-out contracts, which cr~te no externalities across
manufacturers. In this case, we would have ~ = F.
31c, while in any equilibrium of the associated intrinsic common agenq game min {F*, fl~} s c.
~us, k < fi = nA, and ail equilibria are exclusive.
Proposition 5.2 indicates that an optimal exclusive contract and the jointly optimal common
contract have ~ > c. This result is the standard consequence of the tradwff between risk bearing
and incentives. In contrast, in an equilibrium of the intrinsic common agency game, competition
between manufacturers drives wholesale prices @) to (or below) marginal cost.
An interesting contrast to this case arises in the opposite limiting case in which products A
and B are independent in demand. In that case, we can write Pj (qA, q~) = ~j(qj) for j =
where ~j(0) > cj (since qj(cj, @) > O). AS a result, the retailer’s optimal choice q~@j, ~.j)
depends only on ~j. Letting qj(flj) denote this optimal choice, contracts [(F:, p;), (F;, ~~)]
maximize the manufacturers’ joint profits in the intrinsic common agency setting with retailer
reservation utility level U = O if they solve




lE U(e [( Pj(qj(~j)) _~j)qj(~j)] _FA_FB)d0(6)e0.
j =A. B
However, since there are no contracting externalities, any such pair of contracts must also be a
—
equilibrium of the intrinsic common agency game. Hence, k = ~. Mormver, under our
A,B
Nash
assumptions (~, qB) >> 0 in any cooperative common outcome (the argument follows from the fact
that ~j(0) > cj). Hence, nj < 7 for j = A,B. Thus, we have the following result:
Proposition 5.3: Suppose that products A and B are independent in demand. ~en any
undominated equilibrium is a common equilibrium.
C. The effects of banning exclusive dealing
We now consider the effect of banning exclusive dealing.
32
For the case of perfect substituteswith identical costs of production, the next proposition demonstrates that a ban always leads to an
inefficient outcome (recall from proposition 5.2 that, for efficient incentive schemes, ~ > c).
Proposition 5.4: Consider the case of pe~ect substitutes with identical costs of production, and
let figdenote the lowest flj among accepted contracts. ~exclusive dealing is banned, then B“ = c
and Fj = O in any contract accepted by the retailer.
In this case, the welfare consequences of a ban are simple. Consumers benefit from the ban
because lower wholesale price @) leads to lower retail prices. Manufacturers’ profits are unaffected,
since they always earn zero. The negative consequences of inefficient incentive provision are borne
entirely by the retailer, whose payoff falls as a result of the ban.
The second case considered in the previous subsection might at first seem entirely
straightforward. Since exclusion does not occur with independent demand, one might well expect a
ban to be inconsequential. Caution is warranted, however; recall that in section 4.C,
exclusive dealing could alter equilibrium payoffs even if the retailer initially chose to
manufacturers. In the current instance, the effect of a ban is even more surprising:
a ban on
represent both
Proposition 5.5: Suppose that products A and B are independent in demand. If exclusive
dealing is banned, no pure strategy equilibrium exists.
Although we
is general] y assured.
have not verified the existence of mixed strategy equilibria, we suspect that this
However, as long as the manufacturers’ joint maximization problem is strictly
concave, mixed strategy equilibria are not second-best efficient. In that case, a ban on exclusive
dealing cannot yield a Pareto improvement, and may even reduce the payoff to all participants in the
market. Thus, by altering the structure of strategic incentives, a ban on exclusive dealing can reduce
the efficiency of economic activity even in cases where no exclusion occurs.
336. Conclusions
In this paper, we have attempted both to provide a conceptual framework for analyzing the
phenomenon of exclusive dealing and to explore the motivations for and effects of its use, In our
simplest model, our analysis corroborates some of the intuitive arguments concerning exclusive dealing
advanced by Robert Bork. In that simple setting, exclusive dealing arises only when it is efficient
(abstracting from issues concerning imperfect extraction of consumer surplus). However, in that
model, explicit exclusionary provisions are also superfluous - banning them is inconsequential.
By introducing additional features, however, we generate models in which these provisions
serve meaningful functions. As has been asserted by commentators opposed to the practice, these
provisions may be adopted as a means for increasing market power (through non-coincident market
effects). However, they may also be adopted to ameliorate the incentive conflicts that can arise when
a retailer handles the products of more than one manufacturer, as defenders of exclusive dealing have
argued. These formal models also offer the advantage that they allow us to study explicitly the
implications of a ban on the practice. In either case, the welfare consequences of a ban are complex,
Indeed, even when exclusive deal ing is used to augment market power, a ban on explicit exclusion
may simply lead to even less efficient forms of non-explicit exclusion.
The models considered here do not exhaust the set of possible motivations for exclusive
dealing; indeed, many others have been suggested. However, our framework should be useful for
studying the conditions under which other motivations are operable, as well as their consequences for
behavior. We have already suggested, for example, that Marvel’s [1982] explanation for exclusive
dealing (concerning the prevention of manufacturer free-riding) could be captured in our framework.
In any particular practical setting, it can be difficult to determine what motivates the use of
exclusive dealing. For example, in his discussion of the Standard Fashion case, Marvel [1982] argues
that Standard’s use of the practice was motivated by a desire to prevent competitors from copying
34patterns that had proven to be popular, and thereby free-riding on Standard’s investments in pattern
development. (As Frasco [1991] notes, this argument depends on the absence of a competitive retail
sector, since exclusive dealing would not prevent copying to any appreciable extent otherwise). Yet
the facts described by Marvel are also suggestive of the two motivations that we have modelled here.
For example, Marvel notes that Standard fared poorly after the decision. He attributes this to a
competitor’s new innovation and new entry, without acknowledging that both of these developments
may have been stimulated by the court’s ban on exclusive dealing (as modelled in section 4). At the
same time, Marvel also notes that the wholesale prices charged by Standard for patterns were
significantly above the manufacturers’ marginal costs prior to the decision, which is consistent with
our model of retailer risk-aversion. Mormver, he cites evidence indicating that, following the ban on
exclusive dealing, manufacturers increased the fixed fee component of their charges (by charging for
display equipment and catalogs), as our model would predict. It appears that there is insufficient
evidence to resolve precisely what motivated Standard’s use of these provisions.
Our models have two notable limitations. First, we have assumed throughout that all
manufacturers are active bidders for contracts with retailers. This seems to reflect reality in many,
although not all, settings. Some recent papers studying the use of exclusivity provisions (or their
cousin, stipulated damage provisions) when one manufacturer has a first mover contracting advantage
are Aghion and Bolton [1987] and Rasmusen, Ramseyer, and Wiley [1991]. Second, and perhaps
more importantly, we have restricted our focus here to markets served by a single retailer. This is an
unrealistic assumption for many markets. Exclusive dealing rarely precludes rival manufacturers
completely from reaching consumers in a market. An important area for future research is the
extension of our analysis to such circumstances. Recent papers that make a stati in this direction
include Besanko and Perry [1993, 1994] (who follow Mathewson and Winter [1987] in restricting
attention to the simple wholesale price contracts) and Martimort [forthcoming],
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For the sake of brevity, many of the following proofs have been




Lem~ A.1: Suppose (A.1) - (A.4) hold. ~en, for any (P:, P: d), there exists (p;, P;)
such that [(P;, Pi), (P;, Pi), d] is a common equilibrium of the contracting game only it
(a) uc(P~, P;, u’) > U“
(b) ~~, P;, u’) is an equilibrium of the associated intrinsic common agency game in which the
retailer has reservation utili~ uc(P~, P;, a’),
(c) my(P~, P;, d) > H~(uc(P~, P:, d)) for j = A,B.
~ (a) - (c) hold and we also have (d) m~(P~, P:, d) > ~(uc(p~, P;, d)), then such a (F’:,Ps) exists.
Proof of Lemma A. 1: Necessity is easily verified. For suticiency, we argue that if (a) - (d)
hold for some (P;, P;, d), then there is a common equilibrium of the form [@;, Pa, (~;, P;), d]
in which maxa,, ~ UJ(~.e UJ) = uc(P~, P~, &) forj = A,B. Note, first, that (A4) implies that
J’
exclusive contracts exist that satisfy this equality. Now, if (a) is satisfied, the retailer is willing to
accept both manufacturers’ offers. Moreover, with exclusive contract ~~i being offered, any
deviation by manufacturer j that results in the retailer continuing to accept manufacturer j’s offer
must give the retailer a payoff of at least UC(P;, P;, d). Condition @) therefore implies that there is
no profitable deviation for j that has the retailer accept both manufacturers’ offers, while (c) implies
that there is no profitable deviation for j that has the retailer accept only manufacturer j’s offer.
Finally, (d) implies that no deviation that results in the retailer rejecting manufacturer j’s offer can
raise j’s payoff either (since the retailer would then accept i # j’s offer). QED
Proof of Proportion 2.1: The first part of (A6) rules out no-contracting equilibria. The
second part of (A6) implies that g“l(IIfl + II: - max{fi, HA, HB}) > U“, i.e. that the retailer’s
37equilibrium payoff (as given in the statement of the proposition) exceeds its reservation utility.
(i) max {HA, H’} > fi. The discussion in the text implies that, if manufacturer j‘s contract
is accepted in an exclusive equilibrium, then ~ = max{HA, H’}. Moreover, in the best exclusive
equilibrium (for the manufacturers) the retailer earns W such that ~ - g(U’) - ~ = O (i # j), so
UC = g-’~j - H{) = g-l@ + ~ - ~), manufacturer j earns ~ - g(U’) = ~ - ~, and manufacturer i
earns @ = ~ -~j. Part (c) of Lemma A. 1, however, implies that manufacturer k’s payoff
(k = A,B) in a common equilibrium with a retailer who earns U is bounded above by
k(u) - rI:(u) = R - rr:, where m # k. Since fi < ~, both manufacturers must do strictly
worse in any common equilibrium than in the best exclusive equilibrium.
Note, moreover, that when (A7) holds, then in any common equilibrium
7r;(P:, P;, u=) 2 l-Ij for i = A,B and j # i (otherwise i could be assured of raising its payoff
by offering no contracts). Since in any common equilibrium in which the retailer earns U we must
have T~(P~, P~, d) > H; - g(U) , this implies that in any such equilibrium R - g(U) > Hi +
~ - g(U) = ~ - g(U); this cannot hold for both manufacturers when max {HA, H’} > ~.
(ii) ~ > max {IIA,HB}. From part (i) we know that each manufacturer j’s payoff in any
common equilibrium is bounded above by ~ - H! for i # j. When R > max {HA,HB} this
amount dominates j’s payoff (for j = A,B) in the best exclusive equilibrium (see part (i)). Thus,
we establish the result by showing that common equilibria exist that achieve this upper bound for both
manufacturers. Define U’ = g.l(TIfl + 11~- ~) > UO and consider any (P;, P;, d) t &(UC). This
generates an aggregate manufacturer payoff of fi(Uc) = fi - g(g-’~~ + H: - @)) = 2ti - H: - II:.
Assumptions (Al) - (A4) imply that there is a level of K t R such that (P; + K, P; - K, u’) t &(U’)
and r~(p~ + K, P; - K, u’) = ~ - II: (i # j) for j = A,B. Since R > max {HA,HB}implies
fi - ~ > H; for j = A,B, i # j, condition (d) of Lemma A. 1 holds for the common contracts and
action choice (P; + K, P; - K, u’). Since conditions (a) - (c) hold as well (for (a), we have U’ >
38UO;for (c), we”have k - H! > , - ~ -- these both follow from (A6)), Lemma A. 1 tells us that there
exist exclusive contracts (P;, P;) such that [(P:, P; + K), (P;, P; - K), d] is a common
equilibrium of the contracting game. Note, finally, that any common equilibrium yielding these
manufacturer payoffs must give the retailer exactly W.
(iii) fi = HA. Immediate from parts (i) and (ii). QED
Proof of Proposition 3.2: Let ~~,H~,U~ be the undominated equilibrium payoff defined in
proposition 3.1. It is straightforward to verify that [(~~, ~~), (~~, ~j), x“”] with ~~(xj) = ~(xj) =
H; + cj(xj) is an undominated common equilibrium. Since this equilibrium satisfies the constraint
that P~(Xj) = ~(xj), it continues to be an equilibrium in the restricted game. Suppose that there is
some other equilibrium of the restricted game that generates profits (TIA,~~) for the manufacturers,
such that for some manufacturer j, Hj > ~. Then it can be verified that manufacturer -j has a
profitable deviation to the contract P.j(xj) = ~.j + ~) + c.j(x.j) -- a contradiction. Thus, no other
equilibrium of the restricted game generates higher payoffs for either manufacturer. QED
Proof of ProposUion 4.2: The proof consists of two steps. (i) 1~ x:, @ D, all undominated
equilibria are explicitly exclusive. By Proposition 2.1, we establish the result by showing that W <
R (recall that fic = H’ under (C2)). Suppose R = R. Then there is an equilibrium of the
intrinsic common agency game with retailer reservation utility O in which retailer 1 chooses (x~,,O).
Suppose this retailer accepts (P:,, P;,). Then one can verify that,
a profitable deviation to ~~l(x~,) = P;I(0) + E + c~x~l - I(x~l >
for sufficiently small ~ > 0, B has
O)@: - H! - K~) -- a contradiction.
(ii) ~ X:l e D, for any explicitly exclusionary undominated equilibrium, there is an equivalent
equilibrium without explicir exclusion. By Proposition 2.1, we establish the result by showing that
ti = fi’. It can be verified that the following are equilibrium offers in the intrinsic common agency
game with retailer reservation utility of O, and induce the retailer to choose (x~l, O):
39P;, (X*, ) =
1 cn otherwise
P;l(XB, ) = CBXB, -1(x,, > O)(~-H:-KB). QED
Proof of Proposition 4.3: The proof consists of three steps. (i) If (C4) holds and exclusive
dealing is banned, there is an effectively exclusive equilibrium with jirst period sales of (i*l, O). One
can verify that the following contracts and the choice (~*1, O) for retailer 1 constitute an equilibrium:
{
R(~A1,O) -[H! +m+ -~~ -K~)] if XA,=iA,
‘A,(XA, ) =
m otherwise
PB, (XB, ) = CB,XBI -1(x,, > O)(~-Ht -K,)
(ii) ~ (C4) holds ati exclusive dealing is banned, (iA,, O) is sustainable as an equilibrium
outcome through contracts satisfying PB1(xBI) 2 CBXBI - I(xB1 > O)@; - H: - K~) On/y if iAl = iA1.
Suppose not, and let (PAI, P,,) be the equilibrium contract offers for market 1. Then it is easy to
verify that tAl ~ D (otherwise B has a profitable deviation). Recall that D+ is defined analogously
to D, with < replacing <. Since (by assumption) CIOS(D+) = D and since R,(o) is continuous,
for any b > 0 one can find x*l(6) t D+ such that (R(XA1,O)
6. It can be verified that, for sutilciently small (6,6) >>0, A
‘*, (X*,)=
{
R,(XA, (b)) -(UC +6) if ‘*I ‘X*1(6)
m otherwise,
where U c q RI (~~.o) - pAl(~Al) -- a contradiction.
(iii) ~ (C4) holds and exclusive dealing is banned, no
sustainable through contracts satisfying PBL(xB1) 2 CBXBI - I(xB1
cAiA,) - (R(x~l(b), O)- CAXA1(6))
has a profitable deviation to
<
> O)@z - H; - K~). Suppose not,
c). Then, defining XA,(6) as defined as above and let (PAI,PBI) be the contracts supporting (x~,, xBl




R,(XA, (b),()) - U“ -6 if ‘Al = ‘Al(a)
w otherwise. QED
Proof of Proposition 4.4: The proof of this result has two pa~. (i) men the inequaliq in
(C4) is (strictly) reversed and exclusive dealing is banned, there is an equilibrium in which both
manufacturers’ contracts are accepted and sales in market 1 are (x~;, xBl “~. We construct this
equilibrium as follows. Define, for CY> 0,
D(a) = {xAl I max[R, (xA1,x~l)-c, x,, +1(x,, > O)(~-ll$-K, )-cr] <R, (xA1,O)} .
%,
Note that D = D(0) and D(a) ~ D(a’) for a’ > a. We require one additional technical
assumption (strengthening D = CIOS(D+)): D(u) = clos(D+(a)), where D+(CY) is defined
analogously to D(cr) with < replacing <. This implies that D(a) is a continuous
correspondence. Next, define ti~ as the solution to
Under our assumptions, ti~ exists and is strictly positive. It can be demonstrated that the following
strategies give rise to an equilibrium supporting (xl;, x;):
PB(XB,) = aB +CBXB,-1(x,, > O)(~L-Hj -K, )
(ii) When the inequalip in (C4) is reversed and exclusive dealing is banned, all undominated
equilibria have x~, > 0. Since B earns O if xBI = O, B’s payoff is strictly higher in the non-
exclusive equilibrium described above since (since ti~ > O). Now consider A. In any equilibrium
with x~l = O, XA,t D, and the retailer’s payoff must be at M ~ + fi - H; - K~ (otherwise B
41would have a profitable deviation to a “sell-out” contract). Thus, A can earn at most
(





< ~+~(~-II\)-K, -[11~+ (~-11:-K,)]
=(~-rI;; +( E-rI:)= aA,
where the inequality follows from the fact that (C4) is strictly reversed. QED
Remark: As claimed in the text, banning exclusive dealing may increase B’s payoff, even if
the outcome is non-exclusive both with and without the ban. B’s payoff in a non-exclusive
equilibrium without a ban is @ + ~ (~A - ~~) - K, - (H; +H;) (this is precisely @ - H’), in
j
accordance with Proposition 2. 1), With a ban, A’s payoff is unchanged, and B’s payoff is
Thus, if x~, ~ D(&~), the ban leaves B’s payoff unchanged (a sufficient condition is x~l t D). If
x~[ @ D(&~), the ban strictly increases B’s payoff (recall that H: > @ - H!).
Proof of Propositiotz 5.2: Suppose that [(F;, ~~, (F:, ~~)] maximize the manufacturers’
joint profits in an intrinsic common agency game with U = O and that they also constitute a Nash
equilibrium of this game. Consider a deviation by j to the contract ~j~j), ~j) such that
Manufacturer j’s expected profit with this change is ~j@j) = @j - cj)q~@j, ~~) + Fj@j), while
manufacturer -j earns ~-j@j) n (fl~j _ c-j) q~j@j, ~Uj) + F_~ If [(F:, fl~, (F;, ~~)] maximizes the
ZdNote [hat with ~on~~nt absolute risk-aversion, the retailer’s reservation utility constraint always binds at [(F:, ~~), (F;,
di)l. Thus, Fj(~) = ~.
42manufacturers’ joint profits then ~~(~j”) + ~~j(~j”) = O Q = A, B), while [(F;, 61), (F:, 6;)] is a
Nash equilibrium only if r~(~~) = O (j = A, B). Hence, it must be that
~~j(d~) s(~~j -c.j)dq:j(6j”,P~j)/~flj GO O GA, B), which by (D1) requires P; = CAand 6; =
c,. But, letting ~“ = (61 ,P; ), q“ = (%@~, qi@?), and computing F~(6~ ) using tie implicit
function theorem, we can write ~~@~) + ~~j(~j”) =O (j = A,B) as
= o,
where the term in brackets is strictly positive (I3 and u’(0) are perfectly negatively correlated).
Using (DI) again, it follows that (6; - cj) # O for some j. (In fact, one can show that @~ - cj)
>> 0 for j = A, B.) Hence, [(F;, 6:), (F;, P;)] cannot be a Nash equilibrium. QED
Proof of Proportion 5.2: Consider first the outcome of an exclusive arrangement between the
retailer and manufacturer j, where the retailer’s reservation level is O.
for Proposition 5.1 shows that, if (Fe,&) is manufacturer j’s optimal
q~(@) >0 (which follows from qj(cj, m) > O), we have ~’ > C.
An argument that parallels that
contract, then since
Since A and B are perfect
substitutes, any pair of contracts [(F:, 6;), (F:, ~;)] that maximize the joint payoff of the two
manufacturers in an intrinsic common agency setting must satisfy min {D:, B:} = @ and F: + F;
= F“ for some optimal exclusive contract ~e, 6’). Hence, fic = HA. However, if [(F:, pi), (F;,
~:)] is a Nash equilibrium of this game, then min {pi, ~~) < c (otherwise some manufacturer j
can increase his expected profit by deviating to contract (F~,~!j - ~) for some ~ > O). This
implies that fi < R = HA. By Proposition 2.1, all contracting equilibria are exclusive. QED
Proof of Propostiion 5.4: One can verify that there exists an equilibrium where (Fj, ~j) =
(O,c) for j = A,B, and the retailer accepts at least one manufacturer’s offer. We now argue that, in
43any equilibrium, ~“ = c. First, suppose that ~“ < c. Without loss of generality, suppose that O.j
= ~“, and that the retailer accepts -j’s offer. Then j must earn zero profits (the retailer would not
accept any contract that gives j positive profits). It can be verified that j has a profitable deviation
to (~j, C) where ~j = F.j + ~“ - c)q’@~ + 6 for some small
suppose that 6“ > c. If the retailer accepts both contracts and
~ > 0-- a contradiction. Second,
~. = d, = B“, then it can be verified
that some j can profit by deviating to (FjJ~*- t) for some small e > 0. For all other casm, it can
be verified that some j, who earns zero, can profitably deviate to (Fj,~j) = (0,6’) for some 6’ e
(c,min{P(0),6-}). This contradicts e“ > c.
Finally, we argue that
@js p“ E C, one must have
Fj = O for any accepted contract. This is immediate if ~j > ~-. If
Fj > O; otherwise, j’s payoff would be negative. If Fj > 0, then -j’s
payoff must be zero (either -j’s offer is not accepted, or B.j = c and F.j = O, or B.j > C, F.j = 0,
and q.j = O); hence, -j would gain by deviating to (Fj - ~, C) for some small ~ > 0. QED
Proof of Proposfiion 5.5: The proof consists of four steps. (i) In any equilibrium, both
contracts are accepfed and U* = UB = UAB> 0
utility if only j‘s contract is accepted, and if both
(where Uj and UM are,
contracts are accepted).
respectively, the retailer’s
Suppose on the contrary
that j’s contract is rejected. Then one can verify that j has a profitable deviation to
for sufficiently small E > 0-- a contradiction. A similar argument implies that ~j <
A,B. Now suppose that UAB= O. Let Rj E [Pj(q,(~j))- ~j]qj~j). Since ~j < Pj(0),
[ [
(1 -UA)(l -U’) = e“’ea”[ me-a@RAd@(@)][ - e-’RBd@(6)]
.
[
< e’” eaF’ [ e“OR’ e‘a’Rsd*(0)] = (1 -U*B) = 1.
@j,Pj) = (E,c)
Pj(0) for j =
Rj > 0. ~US
But this can hold only if U’ > 0 for some j, in which case the retailer would not accept both
offers -- a contradiction. Hence, U*B > 0. Finally, if U-J < U*B, then j has a profitable
deviation involving a small increase in the value of Fj -- a contradiction. Hence, U* = UB = UAB.
44(ii) In ‘anyequilibrium, ~j = fly, where fly is defined as the optimal choice of ~j in an
exclusive relation be~een j and the rerailer. Define ~@j,U) to be the level of Fj that gives the
retailer expected utility U when offered slope parameter ~j in an exclusive with j. Now suppose
~j # ~~, and let U- denote the retailer’s expected utility in equilibrium. One can verify that j has
a profitable deviation to [~@~,U2 - ~, p;] for some small t > 0-- a contradiction.
(iii) In any equilibrium, ~j = 6~@.j), where ~~~-j) denotes j ‘S optimal slope parameter
given any contract of the form (F.j,~.j) in a setting with intrinsic common agency. Define ~(~jJU ~
fl.j,F-j) analogously to ~(~j,u) in step (ii). Suppose Bj # d~~.j). one can verify that j has a
profitable deviation to [F~@~(~.j), U” I O.j,F.j) - ~, ~~”(~-j)] for some small ~ > 0-- a contradiction.
(iv) p; # dj== (~:j ). d; and ~~”(~-j) must satisfY the following first-order conditions:
.
(~; - Cj) ~qg ) +qj(Bj”)[l - ~(RJ”)] =0
J
and
(fij” l (B-j) - Cj)
‘qj@j’ l (P-j))
aflj
+ qj(~j”(@.j))[l –((R1 =(dB) + R; .(PA))] =o
m .
[ [
where {(R) = e-a0R0d$(8)/ e+oRd@(0), Rj* = (~j(qj(~j” )) -6; )qj(6~), and
Rj- l (B;) = (~j(qj(~~ - (P_j)) - P; “(p-j)))qj(~~ “(~-j)). If b; = 6; l (6;), hen
Rj**(~~j) = Rj” > 0 (where the sign of this term follows from Pj (0) > c). Consequently, since
both first-order conditions must be satisfied, we have RR;) = ~R~ + R;) for j = A,B. Using the
Cauchy-Schwarz inequality for the variables x = (e*oR)’~and y = (e-OR)’A O, it is possible to show
contradiction,
Since step (iv) contradicts steps (ii) and (iii), no pure strategy equilibrium exists. QED
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